THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SUGGESTS AN
ANSWER TO THE "FAIR TRIAL-FREE PRESS" DILEMMA
In response to the increasingcontroversy subsumed under the label
of "fair trial-free press;" the American Bar Association has issued
a Tentative Draft of Standards. This comment examines the impediments posed to a constitutionally fair trial by unbridled publicity and evaluates the proposed solutions, with particular emphasis upon the ABA's recommendations.
THE RIGHTS of the criminally accused have received ever increasing

protection in recent years.' At the same time, however, it has
become apparent that inflammatory publicity and other prejudicial
extraneous influences may impair the right to a fair trial. 2 Indeed,
several recent Supreme Court cases have dealt with the prejudicial
effect of publicity on the fairness of state criminal prosecutions.3 It
is here contended that the problem of ensuring fairness and impartiality involves more than a consideration of the impact of
prejudicial publicity upon the impartiality of the trier of fact.
Thus, the term "prejudicial extraneous influence" has been selected
to denote any influence which tends to result in the conviction of
the accused other than competent and permissible presentation at
trial.4 This comment will focus first upon the rights of the accused
which may be diluted by the impingement of prejudicial extraneous
influences. Thereafter, suggested methods of control will be evaluated, giving primary consideration to the remedies proposed in the
Tentative Draft of Standards of the American Bar Association's
Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press. 5
'See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See
generally Brennan, Extension of the Bill of Rights to the States, 44 J. URBAN LAw 11
(1966); Weihofen, Supreme Court Review of State Criminal Procedure, 10" Am. J.
LEGAL
Hisr. 189 (1966).
2
See, e.g., INBAU & SOWLE, CASES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1089-91 (2d ed. 1964); Gold-

farb, Public Information, Criminal Trials and the Cause Celebre, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv.
810-12 (1961); Jaffee, The Press and the Oppressed-PartI, 56 J. Caxm. L., C. & P.S. 1
(1965); Will, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, 12 DEPAuL L. REv. 197-201 (1963); Note, 54
Ky. L.J. 141, 143-50 (1965).
3Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 US. 723
(1963); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
'See, e.g., notes 60-61 infra and accompanying text.
'ABA ADvisoRY CoMMrrrEE ON FAIR TIAL AND FREE PRESS, STANDARDS RELATING TO
FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (Tent. Draft Dec. 1966).
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RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL

The accused's right to a fair trial has long been fundamental to
Anglo-American criminal justice.6 The sixth amendment to the
Constitution guarantees the defendant in a federal criminal trial
the right to a trial by an impartial jury.7 Although this sixth amendment right has not been extended to state criminal proceedings as
an element of fourteenth amendment due process," due process does
require that the accused receive a fair trial9 which includes the
requirement that the decision of the trier of fact-whether judge or
jury-must be impartially rendered. 10
AN IMPARTIAL JURY AT IMPANELMENT

In one of its earliest forms the jury consisted of a group of witnesses to the alleged offense.1 1 However, by Lord Coke's day a juror
was required "to be indifferent as he stands unsworne."' 2 This standard was carried to the colonies, and under early American law a
prospective juror was disqualified if he had formulated an opinion
,,See COKE, LrrrLETON §§ 155-56 (b). A fair trial, however, does not mean a trial
free from all error. E.g., State v. Haffa, 246 Iowa 1275, 1286, 71 N.W.2d 35, 42
(1955); State v. Rush, 108 W. Va. 254, 260, 150 S.E. 740, 742 (1929).
7 U.S. CONsr. amend. VI. The impartiality of a decision is also of interest to the
government, for such a quality is necessary for fulfillment of its mandate to fairly
administer criminal justice. Further, controls of prejudicial publication during criminal proceedings would relieve the government of the financial and manpower expenditure accompanying relitigation of cases in which press coverage has caused
reversal of a prior conviction. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937); State
v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 389, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987
(1965); Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 217, 225-26 (1962).
8 See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, supra note 7, at
324 (dictum); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1899). However, all state constitutions
have some provision for the right of trial by jury in criminal cases. See Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1961), citing COLUMBIA UNIVERSrrY LEISLAnvE DRAFIrING RESEARCH
FUND, INDEX DIGE r OF STATE CONSTITUTIONs 578-79 (1959).

9 "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); accord, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). See
generally Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 815-18.
10
1n re Murchison, supra note 9; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (trial
before a judicial officer who had a financial interest in conviction held a denial of due
process). See generally Comment, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 306, 306-08 (1966); Comment, 57
Nw. U.L. REv. 217, 218-20 (1962); 44 CALIF. L. REV. 425 (1956).
12 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 557-59 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring); Singer
v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 27-34 (1965). See generally 1 HoLDSWoRTH, A HisTORY OF
THE ENGLISH LAW 298-350 (3d ed. 1922); RADIN, ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
204-08 (1936); Warner, The Development of Trial by Jury, 26 TENN. L. REV. 459
White, Origin and Development of Trial by Jury, 29 TENN. L. REV. 8 (1961).
(1959);
22
COKE, LrrmITEoN § 155 (b).
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as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. 13 With the increase of
literacy and the development of mass communication this standard
was abandoned, since it was believed that in newsworthy cases it
would be difficult to impanel literate jurors who had not formed
some opinion of the case. 14 The current standard, adopted in 1878
3
by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States,' is that a
venireman need not be dismissed for cause even though be admits
to having an opinion as to the guilt of the accused if he can state to
the court's satisfaction that he will lay aside this opinion and render
a fair and impartial decision based solely on the evidence as presented at trial.'I The trial judge's discretionary finding on the
challenge of such a juror will be set aside on appeal only upon a
showing of manifest error. 17 Under the Reynolds standard a defendant who claims that his trial was unfair because of the intrusion
of prejudicial extraneous influences must bear the burden of proving
"actual" rather than "probable" prejudice.' 8
21 People v. Miller, 125 Cal. 44, 57 Pac. 770 (1899); Greenfield v. People, 74 N.Y.
277 (1878) (per curiam); People v. Allen, 43 N.Y. 28, 84 (1870). But see United States
v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 49, 51 (No. 14692g.) (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (opinion by Marshall,

CJ.).

21 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1878); Comment, 38 So. CA.
L. REv. 672, 673-76 (1965).
25 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
16
The underlying rationale of the Reynolds approach has been explicated in the
following terms:
"When, shortly before and during a trial, public news media irresponsibly publish
incompetent and prejudicial information, the difficulty of maintenance of fairness in
the administration of justice is manifest. That the work of the courts may continue
without making jury service unduly burdensome, we are allowed to indulge an assumption that the individual jurors will observe the court's admonition and will not read
articles or listen to reports about the subject of the trial." Holmes v. United States,
284 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1960). (Emphasis added.)
"I E.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 248 (1910); Spies v. illinois, 123 U.S.
131 (1887); Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887).
28 See United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 462 (1956); Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181, 198 (1952); Ferrari v. United States, 244 F.2d 132, 138-39
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957); Smith v. United States, 236 F.2d 260, 26970 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352- U.S. 909 (1956); United States v. Carruthers, 152 F.2d
512, 519 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 787 (1946); Oxenberg v. State, 362
P.2d 893, 899 (Alaska), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 56 (1961); Morgan v. State, 211 Ga.
172, 84 S.E.2d 365 (1954). But see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes
v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Jaffee, Trial by
Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 504, 513-17 (1965); Comment, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 306, 308-13
(1966); Comment, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 512, 516 (1966).
The distinction between "actual" and "probable" prejudice is not altogether clear.
Because jurors are not allowed to impeach their verdicts, see notes 175-77 infra and
accompanying text, an accused can probably never demonstrate a concrete, causal link
between prejudicial publicity and an adverse verdict unless a juror makes the im-
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0
More than eighty years after Reynolds, in Irvin v. Dowd,1
a defendant, for the first time exhibited to the Supreme Court's
satisfaction actual prejudice at jury impanelment. No accused had
successfully asserted jury bias in the interim for two reasons: first,
the Supreme Court had never stated what facts were necessary to
establish the trial judge's "manifest error" in accepting a juror's
avowal of impartiality; 20 and, second, the issue had been avoided
by finding that the defendant had waived his opportunity to object
to pre-trial publicity by failing to-,Nexhaust his procedural safeguards. 21 In Irvin, however, the Co'trt stated that when intense
community hostility toward the accused is manifest in the record of
the voir dire examination, a "finding of impartiality does not meet
constitutional standards. '22 Despite the reversal, Irvin did not
a
purport to alter the Reynolds test in any way.2i

The standard for juror impartiality was rendered more uncertain by Beck v. Washington,24 in which Irvin was distinguished
on its facts25 and the claim of a denial of a fair trial based on
probable declaration, on voir dire or during trial, that he will not decide guilt or
innocence solely upon the evidence presented at trial. The cases employing the term
"actual prejudice" have not required such a link, and to the extent the phrase suggests such a connection, it is misleading.
On the other hand, the "probable prejudice" standard requires more than a
demonstration of the existence of prejudicial publicity. To win reversal under this
test, an accused must link the publicity with actual or potential jurors just as he
must under the "actual prejudice" standard. The distinction between "actual" and
"probable" prejudice may lie not in the quantum of proof required for reversal but
rather in the orientation of the appellate court.
"Actual" and "probable" prejudice may merely be labels for an unannounced
weighing of the interaction between the nature and extent of the publicity, the number of actual or potential jurors aware of the prejudicial information, and the extent
the
to which the accused availed himself of the procedural safeguards. If this i;"
distinction, the Reynolds-Irvin "test" for prejudice may not be capable of 6 neral
application and instead proceeds on a case-by-case basis, with an emphasis pi numbers that seems to obscure the basic issue of fairness. See note 27 infra.
'- 366 U.S. 717 (1961); see Manes, Irvin v. Dowd: Retreat from Reality, 22 LAW IN
TAxsrnoN 46 (1962); Comment, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 306, 310 (1966).
20 See Comment, 38 ST. JOHN's L. Rxv. 136, 144-45 (1963).
"See notes 111-17 infra and accompanying text.
22Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961). An examination of the voir dire transscript revealed that ninety per cent of the veniremen had to be excused for cause and
that eight of the twelve jurors initially thought that the defendant was guilty but vowed
they would be impartial. Id. at 727. "One [juror] said that he 'could not . .. give
the defendant the benefit of the doubt that he was innocent.'" Id. at 728.
28Id. at 723-24; Comment, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 306, 308-09 (1966). See note 18 supra.
28369 U.S. 541 (1962).
25 The Supreme Court pointed to the following reasons for affirming the conviction
in Beck: (1) The publicity was factual and not inflammatory. (2) Only twenty-seven
per cent of the prospective jurors examined on voir dire had formed an opinion of
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prejudicial pre-trial publicity was rejected. 26

Thus, the constitu-

tional standard for an impartial jury at impanelment is not at
present clearly defined; 27 however, it is suggested that if fairness is
to be the governing consideration, no juror who admits to having
formed an opinion that the accused is guilty should be impaneled.
SELF-INCRIMINATION

The freedom from compulsory self-incrimination is now a constitutional right of the criminally accused in state as well as federal
prosecutions.2 8 Thus, a conviction may not stand where an accused's
the accused's guilt. (3) None of the jurors had expressed an opinion of the accused's
guilt formed prior to the trial. (4) The publicity and the trial were separated by a
significant period of time. (5) The accused did not challenge for cause any juror
finally selected. The Court relied on the fifth distinction to indicate that the accused
was satisfied that the jurors were unbiased. Id. at 556-58. See Comment, 51 CoRNELL
L.Q. 306, 309-10 (1966).
28 369 U.S. at 557-58.

Compare Geagan v. Gavin, 292 F.2d 244 (Ist Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 903
(1962), with United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 978 (1963).
27

Potential jurors excused
without inquiry as to opinion
Jurors having an opinion
(% of total venire)
Jurors having no opinion
(% of total venire)
Jurors having opinion
(% of those questioned as
to opinion)
Jurors having opinion
(% of defendant's jury)

Denno

Geagan

43.8%

25.4%

40.6%

54.7%

15.6%

19.9%

68.3%

72.2%

16.6%

50.0% (8 of 16)

In both cases, the jurors who admitted preconceived inclinations of guilt or innocence
"expressed themselves in various terms as being able to change the opinion or render
an impartial verdict." 313 F.2d at 368-69.
The Geagan court affirmed a conviction where, of 965 prospective jurors questioned
on their opinions of the defendant's guilt, more than sixty-eight per cent including two
persons who actually served on the jury, admitted preconceived inclinations as to his
culpability. Whether these opinions would have supported acquittal or conviction
was not ascertained. 292 F.2d at 247. In Denno, on the other hand, reversal was
granted where thirty-one of thirty-nine veniremen questioned confessed having
preconceptions, and fifty per cent of the jurors seated thought initially that the accused
was guilty.
Excused for health
Total
or hardship or other
Venire ground without opinion
Opinion
Geagan
1204
239 (25.42%)
659 (54.73%)
Denno
96
42 (43.75%)
39 (40.62%)
28 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).

No Opinion
306 (19.85%)
15 (15.63%)
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evidence, 29

notwithstandcoerced confession has been admitted into
to
establish his
ing the admission of independent evidence sufficient
3
0
Moreover, a confession given voluntarily will not be adguilt.
missible unless the accused is afforded certain procedural safeguards
at the time of his incriminating disclosures.8 ' Lest the jury be led
to infer guilt from the accused's silence at trial, neither the court
nor the prosecution is permitted to comment on his failure to testify
32
in his own behalf.
In view of the safeguards with which the freedom from selfincrimination is circumscribed, it would seem anomalous to permit
the injection of incriminating statements into the proceeding by extraneous sources when such statements may ultimately be excluded
or never offered as evidence. Even if a confession were later admitted into evidence, the fairness and impartiality of the proceeding
might be vitiated by the manner or timing of the extrajudicial dis33
for example, the Supreme Court
closure. In Rideau v. Louisiana,
reversed a conviction for failure to grant a change of venue where
two months prior to the trial a sound film showing the accused
confessing in an "interview" with the sheriff was televised by a local
station on three occasions.3 4 The Court did not scrutinize the
transcript of the voir dire examination as it had done in Irvin.85
"9E.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 510 (1963) (length and illegality of
detention under state law); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 US. 528 (1963) (capitalizing on
individual weakness or incapacities); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (physical deprivations such as lack of sleep or food); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958)
(threats of imminent danger); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (repeated or
extended interrogation); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (physical beatings).
"0Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
$1State courts must exclude incriminating pre-indictment statements made by a
defendant during a time when his right to counsel was being violated. Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In addition, the Court has laid down procedures which
must be adhered to before any confession will be admissible Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436, 471-79 (1966).
"2See O'Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92 (1966) (per curiam); Griffin v. California,

380 U.S. 609 (1965).
" 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
d. at 724.
35 "[']e do not hesitate to hold, without pausing to examine a particularized
transcript of the voir dire examination of the members of the jury, that due process
3"I

of law in this case required a trial before a jury [from another] ...

community ....

Id. at 727. It was this use of speculative prejudice that caused Mr. Justice Clark to
reject the majority's approach: "I must part company with the Court, however, not
so much because it deviates from the principles established in Irvin but because it
applies no principles at all. It simply stops at this point, without establishing any
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The extraneous influence was apparently considered to be so
prejudicial that no showing of actual prejudice was required to
establish the unfairness of the trial which followed. 36
To be contrasted with Rideau is the Court's decision in Stroble
v. California,37 which affirmed a conviction despite the publication
of the accused's incriminating statement to the prosecutor in lurid
detail six weeks prior to the trial.38 There was no proof "that any
juror was in fact prejudiced by the newspaper stories," 39 nor was
there an "affirmative showing that any community prejudice ever
existed or in any way affected the deliberation of the jury."40 However, during the period between the accused's arrest and his trial
the mass media devoted extensive coverage to "crimes against children
and defendant's crime in particular." 41 Perhaps Stroble and Rideau
may be reconciled on the basis that the former involved community
outrage at a particular type of crime, whereas the latter involved
community hostility directed toward the accused. 42 Nevertheless,
basic fairness would seem to require that the accused's freedom from
self-incrimination be protected by permitting only those incriminating statements which are admitted at trial to influence the jury
from the point in time at which such statements are admitted.
EVIDENTIARY SAFEGUARDS

An accused can only be convicted on the basis of evidence obtained without violation of his constitutional rights4 3 and presented
against him in court.4" Moreover, certain rules of evidence have
substantial nexus between

the televised 'interview'

and petitioner's trial, which

occurred almost two months later." Id. at 729. See note 18 supra.
6 "For anyone who has ever watched television the conclusion cannot be avoided
that this . . . was Rideau's trial-at which he pleaded guilty to murder." 373 U.S. at
726. (Emphasis in original.)
'7

343 U.S. 181 (1952).

"The defendant's statement contained admissions of sex play with his victim, a
six-year-old girl, and other children on occasions prior to the killing. Id. at 199
(dissenting opinion). In addition, the local newspapers referred to the accused as
a "werewolf," a "fiend," and a "sex-mad killer." Id. at 192.
' Id. at 194-95.
,Id. at 195..
"People v. Stroble, 36 Cal. 2d 615, 620, 226 P.2d 330, 334 (1951), aff'd, 343 U.S.
181 (1952).
42 Cf. United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 902-03 (2d Cir. 1960).
"I Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-60 (1961). See Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966) (compelled blood test evidence is constitutionally admissible),
1967 DuE L.J. 366.
'"See note 66 infra.
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evolved which preclude the introduction of matter which it is
believed will lead to other than a reliable determination of guilt.4
Such rules govern the admissibility of hearsay,40 opinions, 4 7 and
tests, 48 all of which are admissible only under certain circumstances
and then only for specified purposes.4 9 For example, evidence of
the accused's bad character, generally shown by a prior criminal
record, is admissible as part of the prosecution's initial case only for
limited purposes. 50 Evidence of bad character is not irrelevant, but
the danger of prejudice to the accused outweighs its probative value. "
The effectiveness of these exclusionary rules may be greatly impaired, however, if the evidence which they seek to exclude is permitted to influence the jury through communication from extraneous sources.

2

In Marshall v. United States5 3 the Supreme Court,

54
in the exercise of its supervisory power over the federal courts,
reversed a conviction where during the trial jurors had read newspaper accounts of the defendant's prior criminal record. The trial
judge had refused an offer by the prosecution of proof of prior misdeeds, ruling that the evidence was immaterial and prejudicial to
the defendant. 5 Noting that the jurors had been exposed to "information of a character which the trial judge ruled was so prejudicial it could not be directly offered as evidence," 0 the Court stated
that the prejudice to the defendant was perhaps greater than if the

45WIGMORE, EViDENCE 5 (student ed. 1935).
4" UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENCE 63.
See generally MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE

§§ 223-29

(1954).

17 See

generally id. §§ 11-14.
See id. § 174 and authorities cited therein; Orfield, Relevancy in Federal Criminal
Evidence, 43 NEB. L. REv. 485, 553-59 (1964) and authorities cited therein.
"See generally MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 11-14, 174, 223-29 (1954) and authorities
cited therein.
50See id. §157 and authorities cited therein; Orfield, supra note 48, at 517-31
and authorities cited therein. But see Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
'1

52McCoaicK, EvmENc

§157

(1954).

exclusion of such evidence in court is rendered meaningless when news
media make it available to the public." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 360 (1966).
The Court went on to mentain specifically the publication of Sheppard's refusal to
submit to a lie detector test, statements by witnesses who never appeared at the trial,
and detailed descriptions of clues found by the police but never introduced as evidence in the trial. Id. at 360-61.
5- 360 U.S. 310 (1954) (per curiam).
5' See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
55360 U.S. at 311-12.
"Id. at 312.
8*"The
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evidence had reached the jury as part of the prosecution's case, 57 for
the exposure through news accounts was not "tempered by protective procedures."58 This result was reached despite the trial
judge's denial of a motion for mistrial based upon the jurors'
assurances that, even though they had read the accounts, they could
decide the case solely on the basis of the evidence in the record and
that they felt no prejudice against the accused as a result of having
read the accounts.5 9
In interpreting Marshall,the courts of appeals have reversed convictions where some members of the jury had been exposed during
the proceeding to information concerning the accused's prior criminal record either by disclosure of inadmissible evidence 0 or by

newspaper articles.6 '

In these cases the defendant had only to show

a significant exposure to the prejudicial extraneous influence, 62 rather
than the actual prejudice required under Irvin6 3 to establish lack
of impartiality at impanelment in state prosecutions. Avowals of
impartiality and lack of prejudice by jurors exposed to-such influences during trial are not deemed curative under Marshall,6 but at
least one federal court has taken the position that avowals of im87

1Id. at 313.

I' Ibid.

5Id. at 312. The Court has reconsidered Marshall only once. In Janko v.
United States, 366 U.S. 716 (1961), the Court reversed the conviction summarily.
The opinion stated that the reversal was the result of error confessed by the Solicitor
General and of an examination of the entire record. However, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), decided one week after Janko,
stated that the reversal was due to prejudicial newspaper publicity which had
"poisoned the outcome." Id. at 730.
60Osborne v. United States, 351 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1965); Maestos v. United States,
841 F.2d 493 (10th Cir. 1965); Lane v. Maryland, 320 F.2d 179 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 993 (1963); Thurman v. United States, 316 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1963); Paschal v.
United States, 306 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Rinaldi, 301 F.2d 576
(2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Jacangelo, 281 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1960). But see Bacino
v. United States, 316 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1963).
61United States v. Kum Seng Seo, 300 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962); United States v.
Accardo, 298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962); Holmes v. United States, 284 F.2d 716 (4th
Cir. 1960); Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 855 (1961). But see Marshall v. United States, 355 F.2d 999 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 815 (1966); United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 836 (1963) (exposure to inflammatory headlines not sufficient); United States
v. Feldman, 299 F.2d 914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 910 (1962) (publicity did
not contain detrimental statements).
82 Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d 760 (9th Cir.), cert .denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962)
(must show jurors read detrimental publicity, not merely that it was published). See
cases cited notes 60-61 supra.
61See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
01See notes 53-59 supa and accompanying text.
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partiality may be sufficient when the exposure occurs before the
juror is impaneled and peremptory challenge is not employed to
disqualify him.65 However, it would appear that fairness to the
defendant requires that the sole influence upon the jury be evidence
as presented during trial, particularly when evidence of the accused's
bad character is involved. It is difficult to reconcile the exclusion of
evidence at trial with the circumvention of the exclusionary rule
which occurs when prejudicial information reaches the jury through
extraneous sources. 6
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

An accused is afforded certain constitutional safeguards during
the course of the prosecution, including the right to the effective
assistance of counsel at all significant steps in the proceeding. 7 In
addition, he must be informed of the specific charges against him. s
He has the right 'to be present during all significant stages of his
trial,69 to confront and cross-examine his accusers,7 0 and to present
65See United States v. Shaffer, 291 F.2d 689, 694-95 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
US. 915 (1961), wherein the defendants sought a reversal of their conviction on the
basis of Marshall because of prejudicial publicity which occurred before the trial.
The publicity which the court of appeals characterized as "prejudicial to the defendants" occurred the weekend before the impanelment of the jury. During voir dire
examination five jurors admitted an awareness of the publicity, but the court of
appeals held that Marshall did not apply since the defendants failed to use all their
peremptory challenges despite the possibility of securing jurors who had not heard or
seen the publicity.
86 "The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will
be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside
influence, whether of private talk or public print." Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S.
454, 462 (1907) (Holmes, J.). See Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13

(1959).
67 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932); BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 164-98 (1955); Beaney,
The Right to Counsel: Past, Present, and Future, 49 VA. L. REv. 1150 (1963); Bennett,
Right to Counsel-A Due Process Requirement, 23 LA. L. REv. 662 (1963); Krash, The
Right to a Lawyer: The Implications of Gideon v. Wainnright, 39 NOTRE DAME LAw.
150 (1964); Note, 49 VA. L. REv. 1531 (1963).
eeCole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948).
e9Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892).
70 In three recent cases the Court held that the sixth amendment right to confrontation is extended through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
to bind the states. Parker v. Gladden, 385- U.S. 363, 364 (1966) (per curiam); Douglas
v., Alabama, 380 US. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). This right
applies only to the trial stage of the proceeding and does not extend to the presentence investigation by a judge, Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), to
the sanity hearing of an already convicted defendant, Solesbee v. Balkcum, 339 U.S.
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evidence in his own behalf.7 1 The effectiveness of these protections
may be diminished, however, by the intrusion of prejudicial extraneous influences. Jurors may be exposed to material which is not
presented at trial and which the defendant is not able to challenge. 72
Charges not the subject of the prosecution may be made without
the opportunity for a judicial denial and defense. 3 Supposed
witnesses may make damaging unsworn statements out of court
without being subjected to cross-examination and confrontation. 4
Experience has shown that defense counsel75 as well as the prosecution" will resort to the use of extraneous influences to prejudice the
case in their favor. Under these circumstances, the right to counsel
is of little value unless counsel can act effectively to protect the
accused's interests. 7 7 The question of the guilt or innocence of an
accused is a controversy to be decided not in the market place of
ideas, but rather within the controlled conditions of a court of law.7-1
Therefore, fairness and impartiality would seem to require that only
presentations at trial within the framework of the rights afforded the
accused should be permitted to influence jurors. The impact of
extraneous influences should not be gauged by whether or not they
9 (1950), or to probation and parole revocation proceedings. Escoe v. Ze.rbst, 295 US.
490 (1935) (dictum). See Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and
Sentencing Processes, 75 HARv. L. Rev. 904 (1962). In Jencks v. United States, 353

U.S. 657 (1957), the Court, under its federal supervisory power, held that the accused
was entitled to see and inspect written reports of government undercover agents
for the purpose of impeaching the latter's testimony. See Comment, 88 N.Y.U.L. REv.
113371 (1963).
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58-59 (1932) and authorities cited therein.
72 See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (per curiam); Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333, 360-61 (1966).
78 In People v. Hryciuk, 5 111.2d 176, 125 N.E.2d 61 (1954), the Illinois Supreme
Court awarded a new trial to a prisoner who had been convicted of rape in a trial
in which the jurors were not sequestered and during which two Chicago newspapers
printed stories saying the defendant had, in addition to the crime with which he was
charged, confessed to two murders and had assaulted some fifty women. But see
McHenry v. United States, 276 Fed. 761 (D.C. Cir. 1921).
74See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966); cf. Parker v. Gladden, 385
U.S. 363 (1966) (per curiam).
"sSee United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364, 378-79 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963) (criticizes defense's use of publicity
to aid a plea of insanity); Foreman, A Free Press and a FairTrial-A Defense Attorney's
View, 11 Vxu.. L. REv. 704, 705-06 (1966); Lofton, Justice and the Press-Communication Inside and Outside the Courtroom, 6 ST. Louis L.J. 449, 479 (1961).
78See Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 191-95 (1952); notes 38 supra and 206
infra and accompanying text. See generally Lofton, supra note 75, at 457-60.
77 See notes 36, 58 supra and accompanying text.
-' See note 66 supra.
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are subsequently admitted into evidence, 79 for such a test would be
governed by hindsight and the mere fortuity that certain evidence
may later be admitted. More importantly, the protections available
at trial will not be available at other instances of exposure, especially

the initial exposure, when such safeguards may be most necessary. 80
JUDICIAL SETTING

The purpose of a trial "is to provide a fair and reliable determination of guilt." 81 The guarantee of a public trial has been construed
to preclude a secret trial and its attendant vices, 82 but this privilege
of the accused is not license for a public spectacle. 83 The accused
is entitled to be tried in a judicially serene atmosphere, 84 and although this requirement has not yet been strictly delineated, it now
has at least two facets. First, disruptive influences which prevent
the orderly administration of justice are not permitted;85 thus, noise
and commotion,88 a carnival atmosphere, 87 and mob violence88 must
79See Jaffe, The Press and the Oppressed-Part11, 56 J. CR1m. L., C. & P.S. 158, 166
(1965); Jaffe, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 504, 524 (1965). But see Stroble
v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 193 (1952).
80 See notes 36, 58 supra and accompanying text.
81
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 564 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
821sn re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-73 (1948).
83 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 570-71 (1965) (Warren, C. J., concurring); Rideau
v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963). In Roberts v. State, 100 Neb. 199, 158 N.W.
930 (1916), a conviction was reversed where the trial was moved from the courtroom
to a local theater to accommodate the crowds. See generally Estes v. Texas, supra at
572-78 (Warren, C.J., concurring); Hallam, Some Object Lgssons on Publicity in
Criminal Trials, 24 MINN. L. Rnv. 453, 456-62 (1940); 49 COLUM. L. Rav. 110 (1949).
81See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 355 (1966); Estes v. Texas, supra note
83 at 536; cf. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559, 562 (1965); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 383 (1962).
85See Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra note 84, at 344, where because of the closeness
and number of reporters inside the bar Sheppard's attorney was unable to confer with
his client or the judge without being overheard by the press who subsequently printed
these conversations in newspapers to which the jurors had access.
88 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra note 85, at 355; Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,
536 (1965).
87 "The carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have been avoided since the courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the court." Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966).
The Court criticized the arrangements the trial judge made to accommodate the
press, such as placing a temporary table for the press inside the bar, assigning most of
the seats in the courtroom to the press, allowing a radio station to use a room next to
the jury room for its broadcasting equipment, permitting the press to photograph exte.nsively not only Sheppard but also the jury and the judge himself, and failing to
control the commotion and noise occasioned by the press. Id. at 355.
This situation is to be contrasted with the conduct of the second trial, at which
only Cleveland papers were assigned seats in the courtroom. The out-of-town papers
had to wait in line with the rest of the spectators to secure admission. It is interesting
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be excluded. Second, subtle extraneous influences which might interfere with the reliable determination of guilt are not tolerated;
hence, the probing eye of the television camera is prohibited,8 9 as are
undue pressures on the jurors. 90 In the cases which have dealt with
the element of judicial serenity no specific showing of prejudice was
required, nor were the statements of impartiality made by the jurors
sufficient to prevent reversal. 91 The intrusion of these extraneous
influences alone was held sufficient to deny the accused his consti92
tutionally guaranteed fair trial.
to note that Sheppard's defense counsel, F. Lee Bailey, objected to these stringent
procedures on the ground that they deprived the defendant of his constitutional right
to a public trial. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1966, p. 29, col. 1.
s Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309,
347 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
89In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 352 (1965), only four Justices, Clark, Warren, Douglas,
and Goldberg, stated that they would ban television permanently from criminal trials.
Mr. Justice Harlan voted to reverse only on the specific facts of the case. Id. at 596.
The precedential value of Estes is therefore uncertain. The opinion of the Court
by Mr. Justice Clark found television objectionable on several grounds: (1) it improperly influences jurors by emphasizing the notoriety of the trial, affects their
impartial judgment, distracts their attention, facilitates (when not sequestered) their
watching parts of the trial, and improperly influences prospective jurors and, thus,
endangers the fairness of a new trial; (2) it impairs the testimony of witnesses, causing
some individuals to be frightened and reticent and others to overstate their testimony,
thus frustrating the practice which excludes witnesses from the courtroom except
while testifying; (3) it distracts judges generally and may have a pernicious effect upon those who are elected; (4) it imposes undue pressures on the defendant and intrudes into the confidential attorney-client relationship. Id. at 544-50. In one concurring opinion televising the trial was objected to on three grounds: (1) it deviates
from the purpose of a trial and adversely affects the trial participants; (2) it gives
the public the wrong impression of a trial; (3) it exposes only certain defendants to
prejudicial conditions. Id. at 565 (Warren, C.J., concurring). The other concurring
Justice stated that television is not per se detrimental, but the manner in which it is
used may render it improper in a particular case. Id. at 596 (Harlan, J., concurring).
90For example, jurors may be subject to intense community pressure to reach
a desired verdict. See Meyer v. Cadwalader, 49 Fed. 32 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1891); Lofton,
supra note 75, at 475-77; Comment, 38 So. CAL. L. REy. 672, 681 (1965). A most
flagrant example of community pressure was described by Mr. Justice Holmes in Moore
v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923), where he stated that as a result of the threat of
mob violence the "counsel, jury and judge were swept to the fatal end by an irrestible
wave of public passion ...."
Several notable cases have found prejudice in more subtle influence. Speaking of
the effect of television cameras on jurors and witnesses the Supreme Court stated:
"There is little wonder that the defendant cannot 'prove' the existence of such factors.
Yet we all know from experience that they exist." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 547
(1965). Similarly the court found "extreme prejudice inherent" in the association of
sequestered jurors with the prosecution's chief witnesses, Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
466, 473 (1965), and a presumption of prejudice was raised by unauthorized communication with jurors by bailiffs, Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (per curiam).
"I See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 352-55 (1966); Estes v. Texas, supra note
90, at 542-43; Turner v. Louisiana, supra note 90, at 471-74.
'2 See cases cited note 91 supra.
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PROPOSED METHODS OF CONTROL

Most of the recent commentary dealing with prejudicial extraneous influences and criminal justice has been concerned primarily with the "fair trial-free press" controversy. 3 Various methods of eliminating or controlling prejudicial extraneous influences
have been criticized as interfering with the freedoms of press and
speech,9 4 the right to a public trial,9 5 and the public "need to
know."'9 6 This discussion will evaluate certain proposed methods of
control in the context of such competing considerations, with particular reference to the rights of the accused which in the aggregate
constitute the fairness which these methods seek to ensvre. For
purposes of analysis the proposed methods will be considered within
three classifications: post-trial judicial relief; remedies available at
the trial level; and, the most controversial, antidissemination or nondisclosure techniques. In view of its timeliness, thoroughness and
prestige, the Tentative Draft of Standards of the American Bar
Association's Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free PressP 7
"9E.g., Daniel, Fair Trial and Freedom of the Press, Case & Com., Sept.-Oct. 1966,
p. 3; Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trial and the Cause Celebre, 36 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 810 (1961); Hudon, Freedom of the Press Versus Fair Trial: The Remedy Lies
with the Courts, 1 VALPARASO L. REv. 8 (1966); Jaffe, The Press and the Oppressed
(Parts I-11), 56 J. CRum. L, C. & PS. 1, 158 (1965); Jaffe, Trial by Newspaper, 40
N.Y.U.L. REv. 504 (1965); Lofton, Justice and the Press-Communication Inside and
Outside the Courtroom, 6 ST. Louis L.J. 449 (1961); Mueller, Problem Posed by Publicity to Crime and CriminalProceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1961); Otterbourg, Fair
Trial and Free Press: A New Look in 1954, 40 A.B.A.J. 838 (1954); Royster, The Free
Press & a Fair Trial, 43 N.C.L REv. 365 (1965); Segal, Fair Trial and Free Press-An
Analysis of the Problem, 51 MASS. L.Q. 101 (1966); Wiggins, The Press and Conflicts of
Interest, 24 FED. B.J. 358 (1964); Wiggins, The Public's Right to Public Trial, 19

F.R.D. 25 (1957); Will, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, 12 DEPAUL L. REV. 197 (1963);
Wright, Fair Trial-Free Press, 38 F.R.D. 435 (1966); Symposium-Free Press and a
Fair Trial, 11 ViL. L. REv. 677 (1966).
"See Daniel, supra note 93, at 4, 6; Mueller, supra note 93, at 24; Wiggins, The
Press and Conflcts of Interest, 24 FED. B. J. 358, 360-65 (1964).
9"49 CoLuiui. L. Rxv. 110 (1949). See generally Radin, The Right to a Public
Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381 (1932).
98 See Daniel, supra note 93, at 4, 6; Wright, supra note 93, at 435. D. T. Bryan,
American Newspaper Publisher Association Free Press and Fair Trial Committee
Chairman, has warned against any steps that would deprive the public of information
it needs, such as reports of criminal activities and trials. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1966, p. 1,
col. 2.
17ABA AnvisoRY COMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, STANDARDS RELATING
(Tent. Draft Dec. 1966) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS].
The STANDARDS have occasioned a great deal of comment, to a large degree unfavorable.
To FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PROSs

See N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1966, p. 1, col. 2 (D. T. Bryan, A.N.P.A. Free Press and Fair
Trial Committee Chairman); id., Oct. 4, 1966, p. 26, col. 1 (Judge G. C. Edwards,
urges voluntary controls); id., Oct. 5, 1966, p. 43, col. 1 (IV. B. Dickinson, Pres., A. P.
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will be given primary consideration in discussing the trial level and
antidissemination remedies.
POST-TRIAL

While the implementation of some remedial steps may be far
removed from the appellate courts, the ultimate responsibility to
determine whether or not there has been a "fair trial" will rest upon
these tribunals. 98 Although the Standards recmomend that their
nondisclosure provisions be implemented by revision of the Canons
of Professional Ethics9 9 or local court rules, 0 0 even here the courts
would have to adjudicate questions arising from alleged breaches
of such codes and rules and would have to determine the permissible
sanctions.' 0
In discussing the impact of prejudicial extraneous influences the
Supreme Court has indicated that "trial courts must take strong
measures to ensure that the balance [between unrestrained news
reporting and an impartially rendered decision] is never weighed
against the accused,"' 02 and that "appellate tribunals have the duty
to make an independent evaluation of the circumstances."' 03 Several new approaches may be taken on appellate review to implement
this defendant-oriented standard. 0 4 For example, on appeal the discretionary decisions of the trial judiciary'0 5 might be subjected to a
more rigorous test than that of United States v. Reynolds,.0 which
requires reversal only upon a showing of "manifest error."' 0 7 In
Managing Eds. Ass'n; Police Chiefs also voice opposition); id., Oct. 6, 1966, p. 30, col.
1 (C.BS. Pres. Stanton); id., Oct. 9, 1966, p. 89, col. 2 (thirteen out of fourteen newspaper editors polled see A.BA. proposals as curbing press freedom). But see id.,
Oct. 9, 1966, p. 89, col. 2 (B. Hawthorne, Editor of Minnesota Star & Tribune states
that A.B.A. proposals would not bar responsible coverage of crime news).
9$The STANDARDS themselves are not directed specifically to appellate tribunals.

See STANDARDS 1-2. Their assistance in this regard is limited to a demonstration and
documentation of the problems and of the need foi reform.
99 Id. § 1.1.
100 Id. §§ 1.2, 2.1, .3.
101 See id. §§ 1.3, 2.3; In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959); Mack Appeal, 386 Pa. 251,
126 A.2d 679 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957), 105 U. PA. L. REv. 749 (1957).
1o0Sheppard y. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966).
0o-Ibid.
10oDefendant-oriented appellate review has been thought to offer an adequate solution to the entire problem of extraneous influences. See Hudon, supra note 93, at 3839. But see Comment, 33 U. Cam. L. Ra,. 512 (1966).
205 See notes 121-25 infra and accompanying text.
'098 U.S. 145 (1878). See notes 15-23 supra and accompanying text'
20798 U.S. at 156. One suggested solution to the problem of ensuring a fair trial
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order more fully to protect the rights of defendants, appellate courts
might also extend the applicability of the "inherent danger of
prejudice" test which seems to have been adopted by the Supreme
Court in several recent decisions.108 In each of these cases no actual
prejudice to the accused was established, 00 but the Court found that
the particular practice in question held such an inherent danger
of prejudice that the conviction could not be upheld."10
The suggestion of a defendant-oriented standard of review is
particularly relevant to the appellate practice of invoking the doctrine of waiver where a defendant has failed to exhaust all of the
standard procedural remedies at trial. Waiver has been invoked in
cases in which the defendant had failed to seek a continuance,"'
request a change of venue, 1 2 engage in extensive voir dire examinaadvocates curtailment of the trial judge's discretion by requiring him to grant a new
trial automatically whenever specific statutory or judicially established criteria were
shown to be present. See Comment, 33 U. CHi. L. REv. 512, 523 (1966).
10
8See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365-66 (1966) (per curiam) (unauthorized
communication by bailiff to jurors); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350-52 (1966)
(prejudicial publicity and conduct of trial); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965)
(televising of trial and pre-trial hearings); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 473
(1965) (use of prosecution witnesses as bailiffs for sequestered jury); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726-27 (1963) (pre-trial televising of "confession"); Marshall v.
United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (per curiam) (exposure of jurors during trial to
newspaper account of inadmissible criminal record). But see Holt v. United States,

218 U.S. 245 (1910).
109See cases cited note 108 supra. The decisions were reached either as matters
of constitutional law or in the exercise of supervisory power over the federal judiciary.
The important point to note, however, is not the basis for the decisions but the
underlying approach evidenced therein. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
2" See cases cited note 108 supra. The inherent danger of prejudice test is a
substantial departure from the traditional demand for a showing of specific harm.
See note 18 supra and accompanying text. Indeed, several earlier Supreme Court
decisions have denied relief in situations where the inherent danger test would seem
appropriate, since no specific harm was established. See Beck v. Washington, 369 US.
541, 555-58 (1962) (national televising of congressional hearings accusing Beck of
misconduct); United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1956) (preju-.
dicial pre-trial publicity); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 191-95 (1952) (same).
111
See United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, supra note 110, at 462-63; United
States v. Milanovich, 303 F.2d 626, 629 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 876 (1962);
Palakiko v. Harper, 209 F.2d 75, 97-98 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 956
(1954); United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666, 668-69 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 965 (1953).
212 See United States ex reL Darcy v. Handy, supra note
111, at 463; Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181, 193-94 (1952); Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d 120, 123 (10th Cir.
1963); United States v. Milanovich, supra note 111, at 629; Finnegan v. Untied States,
204 F.2d 105, 110 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 821 (1953); United States v. Ragen,
146 F.2d 349, 352 (7th Cir.). cert. denied sub nom. Bongiorno v. United States, 325
U.S. 865 (1945).
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tion,"1 3 exhaust peremptory challenges, 1 4 challenge individual jurors
for cause, 1 challenge the whole jury panel, 1 6 or raise the issue of
pre-trial publicity at the outset of the trial." 7 The theory underlying the waiver doctrine is that the accused should not be heard to
complain that his trial was unfair when he has not exhausted the
methods provided by law to ensure fairness. 1 8 However, the real
goals of a voluntary waiver doctrine, the rational election of known
alternatives"19 and the prevention of specious appeals, 20 may be
achieved by alert trial judges. Whenever the question of possible

prejudice arises, such as by widespread publicity of pre-trial events
or the exposure of a juror to illicit pressure, the trial judge should
be required to ascertain the views of the accused, through counsel,
and of the prosecution, and to append their responses to his decision
and finding of fact as to the existence of prejudice. The doctrine of
waiver would then be applied by appellate courts only in cases in
which there had been a voluntary election by the accused.
TRIAL

Traditionally, the burden of ensuring fairness in notorious cases
has been borne by the discretionary remedies administered by the
12' See United States v. Sorce, 308 F.2d 299, 301 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 957 (1964); United States v. Shaffer, 291 F.2d 689, 694-95 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Share v. United States, 368 U.S. 914 (1961).
21, See United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 463 (1956); United States
v. Milanovich, 303 F.2d 626, 629 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 876 (1962); United
States v. Shaffer, supra note 113, at 695; United States v. Moran, 236 F.2d 361, 362 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 909 (1956); United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666, 668-69
(2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 965 (1953).
"'See Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 557-58 (1962); Rizzo v. United States,
304 F.2d 810 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Nafie v. United States, 371 U.S. 890
(1962); United States v. Beadon, 49 F.2d 164, 166 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 625
(1931).
112See Blumenfield v. United States, 284 F.2d 46, 51-52 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 812 (1961).
217See United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 463 (1956); Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181, 194-95 (1952).
I" See Address by J. R. Thompson, Ass't State's Att'y of Cook County, in INBAU &
SOWLE, CASES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1092 (2d ed. 1964). But see Geagan v. Gavin, 292
F.2d 244, 246 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 903 (1962); Delaney v. United States,
199 F.2d 107, 116 (1st Cir. 1952).
""0Rand v. Morse, 289 Fed. 339, 344 (8th Cir. 1923). The broad application of the
waiver doctrine in the area of fair trial seems anomalous since "'courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights and . . .
'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."' Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); accord, Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
12
See United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666, 669-70 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 965 (1953).
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trial judiciary. These include voir dire examination, challenge of
veniremen, change of venue, continuance, cautionary instructions,
sequestration, mid-trial examination of jurors, waiver of jury trial,
grant of mistrial, and setting aside a verdict of guilty. However,
such remedies have generally been considered to provide inadequate
protection for defendants in cases where public interest and emotions
are high.

121

The Standards predicate broad reform of the administration of
these remedies 122 upon a change in the underlying principle of application. Most trial judges seem to have employed the remedies
sparingly,123 as extraordinary measures compelled only by a showing
that actual harm would result were they withheld, at times basing
denial on the belief that the requested relief would not correct an
admittedly undesirable situation.124 Some commentators have suggested that trial judges are loath to admit the need for such remedies
because they feel it reflects on their ability to ensure fairness in their
own tribunals. 125 As a practical matter, the courts have often held
in abeyance the granting of a change of venue or continuance until
voir dire examination on the theory that the latter provides the best
test for the ascertainment of community hostility.

2

The Standards

would change the basis upon which these trial level remedies would
be invoked from a showing of actual harm to a showing of reasonable likelihood of prejudice 1 27 and would allow qualified opinion
surveys as well as affidavits and opinion testimony as evidence on
121See Jaffee, The Press and the Oppressed-Part 1, 56 J. CRum. L., C. & P.S. 1,
11-12 (1965); Comment, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 306, 313-17 (1966); Note, 60 COLUM. L. REY.
349, 375-80 (1960). But see Wright, supra note 93, at 437.
122

STANDARDS

§§

3.2-.6.

See Address by J. R. Thompson, Ass't State's Att'y of Cook County, in INDAU &
SOWLE, CASES ON CRIMINAL JusTIcE 1092-93 (2d ed. 1964); Will, supra note 93, at 209;
Comment, 33 U. CHI. L. Rv. 512, 515 (1966).
12, Rees v. Peyton, 341 F.2d 859, 863 (4th Cir. 1965) (change of venue held useless
because publicity reached entire state); United States v. Dioguardi, 20 F.R.D. 33, 35-36
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (change of venue denied, partially because entire country exposed to
incident).
2 See Austin, Prejudice and Change of Venue, 68 DICK. L. REv. 401, 408 (1964);
Comment, 33 U. CH. L. REV. 512, 515 (1966).
28 See, e.g., United States v. Hoffa, 156 F. Supp. 495, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (motion
for continuance denied); United States v. Dioguardi, 20 F.R.D. 33, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(motion for a change of venue denied); United States v. Carper, 13 F.R.D. 483, 487
(D.D.C. 1953) (same); United States v. Eisler, 75 F. Supp. 634, 659 (D.D.C. 1947)
(same). But see Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 So. CAL.
503, 505 (1965).
L. REv.
27
2 STANDARDS § 3.2 (c).
28
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motions for relief. 128

Upon a showing of reasonable likelihood

of prejudice, the requested remedy would be granted.

29

Change of Venue
The Standards would permit a change of venue upon motion of

the accused or the prosecution whenever dissemination of potentially
prejudicial material makes it reasonably likely that a fair trial could
not be secured without such relief. 30 The change could be granted

at any time up to the taking of evidence, allowing more than one
move if necessary.'

81

Change of venue has been criticized on several grounds. In the
first instance, it forces an accused to forfeit his right to a local trial

in the hope of gaining a fair trial, which is also his right.

32

Fur-

thermore, in many notorious trials the potential prejudice has
spread far beyond the local level, encompassing an entire state or

even the nation. 33
However, it is likely that in most cases the
danger will be of differing degrees, decreasing at least slightly in
228 Id. § 3.2 (b). The case law has generally excluded opinion polls on the ground
of hearsay or unreliability. See, e.g., Irvin v. State, 66 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 927 (1954). But see State v. Lupino, 268 Minn. 344, 129 N.W.2d 294
(1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965). A number of commentators have suggested
that the use of opinion polls would furnish a more scientific basis for ascertaining
community sentiment, and that comparisons could then be made with the sentiment
in other communities in the jurisdiction. See Goldfarb, supra note 93, at 837; Note,
66 HARV. L. REv. 498, 508-10 (1953); Comment, 33 U. Cm. L. Rv. 512, 527 (1966).
"" STANDARDS § 3.2 (c).
"Reasonable likelihood" is to be determined by use of
several factors, one of which is the opinion of the trial judge. Ibid.
1'1o Id. § 3.2 (a).
Thus, for example, the state would have been granted change of
venue in the infamous 1965 civil rights cases in Haynesville, Alabama, because of the
local prejudice against the victims and in favor of the accused Klansmen. On voir dire
in one of these trials each venireman expressed the belief that the victims were inferior. Address by Honorable Richmond Flowers to Duke Bar Ass'n, Nov. 30, 1966.
See generally Note, 60 COLUM. L. Rav. 349, 360-65 (1960) (compilation of the state
statutes for change of venue and their interpretation).
231 STANDARDS § 3.2 (e).
In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), the problem of
statutory limitations upon change of venue was recognized since Indiana law permits
only one such change. IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-1305 (1956). However, the question was
not resolved in Irvin since the Indiana Supreme Court in State ex rel. Gannon v.
Porter Circuit Court, 239 Ind. 637, 642, 159 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1959), had stated that "it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to provide to every accused a public trial by an
impartial jury, even though to do so the court must grant a second change of venue
and thus contravene the general legislative policy of granting only one change of venue
from the county."
E.g., Address by J. R. Thompson, Ass't State's Att'y of Cook County, in INBAU &
SowLE, CAsES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1092 (2d ed. 1964); Jaffe, Trial by Newspaper, 40
N.Y.U.L. Rv. 504, 517 (1965); Comment, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 306, 314 (1966).
1-1 E.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); United States v. Dioguardi, 20
F.R.D. 33, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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Change of venue has also been criticized as a
more remote areas.
costly and inconvenient device,3 5 although the relevance of such
arguments to the rights of an accused is questionable.
Continuance
Continuance involves many of the same considerations as change
of venue. It too requires the waiver of one right, that to a speedy
trial, in quest of fairness. 36 In situations in which bail cannot be
met, moreover, the cost to the accused in terms of additional pretrial confinement seems especially high. Furthermore, there may
be no assurance that prejudice will abate with the passage of time. 31 7
However, where the potential prejudice seems to derive principally
from public reaction to the commission of the crime, rather than
from extensive dissemination of material relating to the actual proceedings, continuance would seem to be a particularly appropriate
remedy. 3 8 The Standards would condition the grant of a continuance upon satisfaction of the same requirements which are imposed
39
for a change of venue.1
Jury Selection
Under the rubric of jury selection the Standards deal with challenges, the voir dire examination, and the use of panels selected
from outside the district. 140 Proof of a reasonable likelihood of
prejudice would require a grant of the requested relief unless the
judge were convinced that the danger did not in fact exist.
The voir dire examination is one of the most frequently and
harshly castigated of the trial level remedies. It has been con13, See STANDARDS 119-28 and cases cited therein.

235 See Meyer, Free Press v. Fair Trial: The Judge's View, 41 N.D.L. REv. 14, 17
(1964); Comment, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 306, 314 (1966). See also United States v. Bonanno,
177 F. Supp. 106, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.
1960) (expense and inconvenience to the state mentioned as factors in considering
venue change).
231 See Address by J. R. Thompson, Ass't State's Att'y of Cook County, in INAU
& SOIWLE, CASES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1092 (2d ed. 1964); Meyer, supra note 135, at 17;
Comment, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 306, 314 (1966).
237See
Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 119 (1st Cir. 1952) (conviction
reversed for failure to grant continuance of sufficient duration).
"'
See United States ex rel. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973, 976 (N.D. Ill.
1944), aff'd, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 865 (1945) (newspaper stories
related to crimes, but no reference to defendant's case).
239 STANDARDS § 3.2.
14
ld. § 3.4.
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tended, based on psychological studies' 4 ' and judicial reasoning, 142
that the basic premise of voir dire, that a venireman can and will
make accurate responses as to his mental processes, is unsound.
Thus, several recent cases have abandoned the general practice and
have reversed convictions despite uncontradicted avowals by jurors
that they would strictly comply with instructions 143 or were not
tainted by extraneous matters.144
The methods presently used on voir dire often prevent the examination from fulfilling its purpose of impaneling impartial jurors.
The Standards suggest that jurors be questioned singly and separately to preclude contamination of the group by the prejudicial
disclosures of a single juror and to encourage candor by obviating
group pressure to make answers conform to the responses desired. 45
In examining prospective jurors, defense counsel is frequently forced
to disclose the very matter he hopes is unknown in his attempts to
discover bias. In addition, questions are often posed in a manner
such that the desired response is not only clearly shown, but encouraged.146 While the Standards do not contain the proposal, it
Broeder, supra note 126, at 510-15.
'12 Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 112-13 (Ist Cir. 1952); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 201 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
148 See Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959); Delaney v. United
States, supra note 142, at 116. But see Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United
States, 306 F.2d 379, 383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); Callanan v.
United States, 223 F.2d 171, 177 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862 (1955); Bianchi
v. United States, 219 F.2d 182, 191 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 (1955); Finnegan v. United States, 204 F.2d 105, 110 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 821 (1953);
Centuni v. United States, 69 F.2d 624, 625 (9th Cir. 1934); United States ex rel. Burke
v. Denno, 148 F. Supp. 498, 500-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 243 F.2d 835 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 849 (1957).
14 See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno,
313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963); Juelich v. United States,
214 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1954); Delaney v. United States, supra note 143. But see
Thiede v. Utah, 159 U.S. 510 (1895); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887); Hopt v.
Utah, 120 U.S. 480 (1887); Bearden v. United States, 320 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 922 (1964); Rizzo v. United States, 304 F.2d 810 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 890 (1962); Geagan v. Gavin, 292 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 903 (1962); Hawkins v. United States, 116 Fed. 569 (9th Cir. 1902); Gallot v.
United States, 87 Fed. 446 (5th Cir. 1898).
:1 STANDARws. § 3.4 (a). See id. 130-38. Compare Paschal v. United States, 306 F.2d
398 (5th Cir. 1962).
1I" Thus one judge, before asking whether any juror had a fixed opinion, stated:
"Now, a fixed opinion, gentlemen, means a buttheaded opinion . . . . It means the
kind of buttheadedness that you would find in a man with a head the shape of a baseball. Don't ever try to argue with him. He has an opinion on everything, and if
God could speak out of heaven to him, it would have no effect on his opinion." Fuller.
v. State, 269 Ala. 312, 319, 113 So. 2d 153, 158 (1959).
141
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would seem desirable that the questions be neutrally phrased to
avoid disclosing that which it is hoped is unknown. 147 Moreover,
the examination might be conducted with a standard list of questions dealing with possible knowledge of such prejudicial matters
as incriminating statements allegedly made by the accused and the
accused's prior criminal record. The questioning would be prefaced
by the statement that these were standard questions requested by
neither side but required by fairness to both and that they in no
way implied the existence of any such information. Under any form
of questioning, disclosure of the venireman's views rather than the
4
duty of impartiality must be stressed.1

The standard upon which potential jurors may withstand challenge for cause is presently the avowed ability to lay aside any preconceptions of guilt or innocence of the accused. 149 Just as several
recent cases have questioned this standard, stating that it places an
impossible burden of self-analysis on veniremen,'" the Standards
suggest closer scrutiny. Challenges would be granted much more
liberally, based on the extent and type of exposure to prejudicial
matter and the state of mind evidenced by the venireman. Whenever either the admitted state of mind or the extent or type of exposure raises a significant possibility of bias, a challenge for cause
would be sustained.' 51 When the injection of potentially prejudicial
matter into the proceeding raises a serious possibility of juror bias
during trial, the Standards suggest an inquiry gimilar to that on
voir dire.8 2 The method of questioning and the standard for ex1,7 See Krogman v. United States, 225 F.2d 220, 228-29 (6th Cir. 1955).
218 See STANDARDS § 3.4 (a).
1" See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text.
210See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1961); Delaney v. United States, 199
F.2d 107, 112-13 (1st Cir. 1952).
251 STANDARDS § 3.4 (b). Although challenges provide a method of juror rejection
rather than juror selection, Hays v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71 (1887), the entire process
of jury selection has been felt to afford protection to the accused sufficient to obviate
the need for restrictions on dissemination. See Comment, 51 CoRNEL.L L.Q. 306, 32527 1(1966).
5 STANDARM § 3.5 (f). But see Hilliard v. Arizona, 362 F.2d 908 9th Cir. 1966).
Here again, when the jury is polled, intimidating questions or questions which indicate
a desired answer should be avoided. For example in Smith v. United States, 236 F.2d
260 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 909 (1956), a prejudicial article was published
after cautionary instructions had been given. Upon defense counsel's request that,
despite the instructions, the jury be polled as to whether they had read the article,
the court addressed the jury as a whole as follows: "[1]f any juror violated the in-
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cusing a juror would be the same as on voir dire except that a juror
would be excused if he had heard or seen potentially prejudicial
material which if referred to in the trial would constitute grounds
53
for mistrial.
The Standards suggest as a further method for impaneling an
impartial jury that the trial court have authority to draw jurors
from other localities.3 4 This should be done whenever potentially
prejudicial news coverage has been intense and relatively localized.
Here, of course, the outside veniremen would be alerted to the
exceptional nature of the proceeding, and they might resent the
inconvenience of being called to another district for what may
promise to be a protracted trial.155
Waiver of Jury Trial
The Standards recommend that in jurisdictions where there is
at present no absolute right to waive a jury trial, 56 permission for
structions of the court and read the article . . . hold up your hand." 236 F.2d at
269-70.
3
25 STANDARDS § 3.5 (f).
1'5Id. §3.4(c). See Graham v. United States, 257 F.2d 724, 728-29 (6th Cir. 1958).
See generally Note, 60 COLuM. L. REv. 349, 365-67 (1960).
18The danger of transferred resentment has been mentioned as an important
tactical consideration for defense counsel. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707, 713
n.3 (6th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Meyer, supra note 135, at 17; Note,
60 COLUM. L. Rv. 349, 365-67 (1960).
2r, Generally the right to waive a jury trial by one who is charged with the commission of a felony in a state court is not recognized in the absence of statutory
authority. E.g., Morgan v. People, 136 Ill. 161, 26 N.E. 651 (1891); State v. Stricker,
196 Iowa 290, 194 N.W. 60 (1923); State v. Williams, 195 Iowa 374, 191 N.W. 790
(1923). Contra, Marino v. State, 111 Neb. 623, 197 N.W. 396 (1924). Statutes permitting waiver where the accused is charged with a felony, however, have been upheld.
E.g., Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314 (1892); Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 129 N.E. 773
(1920); People v. Sanford, 252 Mich. 240, 233 N.W. 192 (1930); State v. Furstenau, 167
Neb. 439, 93 N.W.2d 384 (1958). States have adopted a variety of procedures by which
waiver of jury trials is permitted. Most require the permission of the trial judge or
prosecutor. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36-37 (1965) (lists many of the
methods states now provide). When the trial arises from a misdemeanor or petty
offense, the defendant may waive his right with or without statute. E.g., Schich v.
United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904); Redd v. State, 169 Ala. 6, 53 So. 908 (1910); State
v. Shearer, 27 Ariz. 311, 232 Pac. 893 (1925); State v. Ross, 47 S.D. 188, 197 N.W. 234
(1924); Osborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249, 126 N.W. 737 (1910). See generally Oppenheim,
Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 25 MicH. L. REv. 695 (1927). The accused is permitted to waive his right to a jury trial in the federal courts
only with the approval of the government counsel and the trial judge. Patton v.
United States, 281. U.S. 276, 312 (1929). See generally Goldberg, Waiver of Jury in
Felony Trials, 28 MicH. L. Rnv. 163 (1929). See Singer v. United States, supra, where
the Court denied the defendant's contention that he had an unconditional constitutional
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waiver be given a defendant when it is determined that the waiver
is voluntary and is necessary to increase the likelihood of a fair
trial. 157 Here again is the problem of relinquishing one right to
obtain another. 158 In addition, in at least one state the jury trial
is a constitutional requirement, 15 9 making this protection a possible
millstone in notorious cases.10 One commentator has concluded
that waiver of jury trial is the only solution to the prejudicial extraneous influence problem.' 1 While our trial judiciary may certainly be expected to be more resolute and less susceptible to influence by prejudicial extraneous matter'0 2 than jurors, several
authorities have questioned their complete immunity from such in0 3
fluences.
Control of Courtroom
Assuming that an impartial jury has been impaneled, the jurors
must be sufficiently insulated to retain their impartiality. Recalling
Sheppard v. Maxwell8 4 and Estes v. Texas,6 5 as well as criticism
directed at several notable earlier trials, 66 the Standards urge the
trial judge to maintain decorum at all times and to supervise closely
those in attendance.0 7
right to waive a trial by jury in the federal courts. See generally Orfield, Trial by Jury
in Federal Criminal Procedure, 1962 DUKE L.J. 29.
Z$,STANDARDS § 5.3.
2"See Meyer, supra note 135, at 18.
1
5 N.C. CoNsr. art. IV, § 12.
160 See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37 (1965); United States v. Kobli, 172
F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949).
161 Note, 11 N.Y.L.F. 533, 546 (1965).
103 "Judges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate."
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947).
216See id. at 391-92 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); (judges appointed for good be.
havior more resolute than a local judge elected for a short term); id. at 395-97 (Jackson,
J., dissenting) (same); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 357 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
164 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
165 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
166 See SULLIVAN, TRIAL By NEWSPAPER

(1961); Hallam, Some Object Lessons on
Publicity in Criminal Trials, 24 MINN. L. REV. 453 (1940); Isaacs, The Crime of Crime
Reporting, 7 CRIME & DELIN. 312 (1961).
This recommendation is not limited to disturbances attrib16' STANDARDS § 3.5 (a).
utable to the press, but would also encompass disruptive and extraneous influences
from other sources. Compare notes 86-88, 90 supra and accompanying text. The
trial judge himself may exert undue influence on jurors. See note 204 inIra and
accompanying text. Spectator conduct may also be influential, see Hallam, supra note
166, at 456-60, 480-84, and some incidents may be so prejudicial that no instruction
will cure them, see Beck v. Wings Field, Inc., 122 F.2d 114, 116 (3d Cir. 1941).
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Sequestration

Sequestration, often criticized for its cost and inconvenience, 108
is encouraged by the Standards. Sequestration is to be ordered on
motion by either party or the court sua sponte on a showing that
otherwise highly prejudicial matters are likely to reach the jury.
Furthermore, the judge would be forbidden to disclose the requesting
party to the jury. 169 The jurors' reaction to being inconvenienced 1 ,0
could be migtiated by explaining that sequestration is necessary
to keep possibly erroneous information from coming to their
attention and to ensure fairness to the accused and the prosecution.
Instructions

Instructions to jurors have long been the subject of tension between faith in the efficacy of the jury system and recognition of the
dangers of prejudicial publicity.' 7 ' While Mr. Justice Jackson's state172
ment demeaning limiting instructions as sheer fiction is legendary,
it is suggested that Judge Frank more accurately expressed the skeptic's doubts when he said that telling a juror to disregard something is
like telling a small boy to stand in a corner and not to think of a
white elephant. 173 These views notwithstanding, the Standards
would have trial judges tell jurors early and often to avoid extrajudicial sources of information and influence. 74
108See Meyer, note 135 supra, at
189STANDARDS § 3.5 (c).

17-18; Comment, 51

CORNELL L.Q. 306, 316 (1966).

110 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707, 713 n.3 (1965), rev'd, 384 U.S. 333 (1966);
Meyer, supra note 135, at 17-18.
IL' See Smith v. United States, 236 F.2d 260, 269-70 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
909 (1956); Beck v. Wings Field Inc., 122 F.2d 114, 116 (3d Cir. 1941) (material so
prejudicial no instruction could cure). See generally FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND 170-85, 302-09 (1932).
But see United States v. Howell, 240 F.2d 149, 158 (3d
Cir. 1956).
172 "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions
to the jury ... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
1.3 United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 865 (2d Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion),

cert. denied, 343 U.S. 946 (1952).
1
7' STANDARDS § 3.5 (e).
Furthermore, the judge should give cautionary instructions

in a manner such as not to make jurors curious to read what they have been warned
against. For example in Centoni v. United States, 69 F.2d 624, 625 (9th Cir. 1934), "the
[trial] Court inquired of the jury present if any of the jurors had read the article,
to which inquiry four of the jurors answered in the affirmative. Thereupon the Court
directed that they be not called as jurors in the case, and that all of the members
of the jury refrain from reading the article appearing on page three of the Tacoma
Times of June 13th, giving them the number of the article and the page upon which
it appeared."
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Setting Aside the Verdict
Finally, the Standards recommend that a verdict of guilty be
set aside and a new trial ordered whenever the court finds on the
basis of competent evidence a substantial likelihood that the vote of
one or more jurors had been influenced by exposure to an extrajudicial communication relating to the defendant or the case which
was not part of the trial record. 1 5 Competent evidence would undoubtedly include circumstantial evidence or testimony of one who
was not himself a juror. However, the Standards' recommendation
expressly disclaims any intention to affect the generally prevailing
rule against permitting jurors to impeach their own verdicts. 70
In jurisdictions in which this prohibition is in effect, the Standards'
recommendation would be less effective in discovering the impact
of prejudicial extraneous influences on jurors than it would be in
the minority of jurisdictions which permit jurors to testify to the
77
existence, although not to the effect, of extraneous influences.
Summary
The remedies available at trial, as strengthened and expanded by
the Standards, would increase the likelihood of a fair decision. Indeed, given an impartial panel, these safeguards seem adequate to
insulate the jury until verdict. However, since no chain is stronger
than its weakest link, it is arguable that the degree of impartiality
attained can be no greater than that of the jury impaneled after voir
dire and challenges. 178 Because the chorus condemning the effectiveness of these impaneling procedures in notorious cases is growing as
empirical data is gathered, 79 the protection afforded by the trial
level remedies in such cases would seem to be inadequate.
275

STANDARDS § 3.6.

Ibid.
217 See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892). See generally Comment, 25
U. Cnx. L. REv. 360 (1958).
(1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see Com178 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729
ment, 33 U. Cm. L. REV. 512, 514 (1966).
1179
Broeder, Voir Dire Examination: An Empirical Study, 38 So. CAL. L. Rv. 503,
528 (1965); Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trials and the Cause Celebre,
36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 810, 821-22 (1961); Jaffee, The Press and the Oppressed-Part1, 56
J. CRAM. L., C. & P.S. 1, 17 (1965); Will, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, 12 DEPAUL L. REV.
197, 209-11 (1963); Note, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 349, 377 (1960); Comment, 51 CORNELL
L.Q. 306, 313 (1966); Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 217, 235 (1962).
178
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ANTIDISSEMINATION

In addition to the proposed methods of control based on posttrial and trial level remedies, courts, legislators, and commentators
have advocated restrictions on the extrajudicial dissemination of
potentially prejudicial material. 8 0 The antidissemination proposals
vary with respect to the subject matter,' 8 ' timing, 182 and imple218 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966); State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369,
889, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987 (1965); Dep't of Justice
Release Relating to Criminal Proceedings, 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (1965); S. 290, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965) (reproduced and evaluated in Comment, 33 U. Cm. L. Rav. 512, 51819 (1966)); Mass. H.B. 3991 (1965) (reproduced and evaluated in Comment, 33 U. Cm.
L. Rxv. 512, 519-22 (1966)). See INBAU & SOWLE, CASES ON CmIMINAL JusrIcE 1093-96
(2d ed. 1964); Jaffee, The Press and the Oppressed-Part II, 56 J. Canm. L., C. & P.S.
158, 166-69 (1965); Jaffee, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 504, 523-24 (1965);
Will, supra note 179, at 214-16; Note, 60 COLUm. L. REv. 349, 370-75 (1960); Note, 54
KY. LJ. 141, 150-54 (1965); Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 217, 250-54 (1962); Comment,
3 U. Cmu. L. REv. 512, 523-30 (1966). But see Goldfarb, supra note 179, at 835-38;
Jaffee, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 504, 519 (1965); Wright, Fair TrialFree Press, 88 F.R.D. 435, 436-37 (1965).
At one extreme are those who feel that prejudicial extraneous influences are becoming more prevalent and that action is therefore required (beyond reversals) to
secure to the accused a trial free of these outside influences. See Sheppard v. Maxwell,
supra at 362; State v. Van Duyne, supra at 388, 204 A.2d at 851; Note, 54 Ky. L.J.
141 (1965); Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 217 (1962). In the intermediate position are
those who recommend the use of voluntary or indirect restraints before application
of antidissemination controls. See Will, supra note 179, at 211-14; Comment, 33 U.
Cm. L. Rav. 512, 523-30 (1966). Finally, there are those who recommend other solutions to the problem. See Comment, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 306, 325-27 (1966) (jury selection); Note, 11 N.Y.L.F. 533, 546 (1965) (waive jury trial).
On the other hand, the opponents of nondisclosure contend that there is no need
for restrictions on dissemination since the number of cases involving prejudicial
extraneous influences is small and that any advantages derived from such restrictions
are far outweighed by the benefits of an unshackled press. See Daniel, Fair Trial
and Freedom of the Press, Case & Coin., Sept.-Oct. 1966, p. 3, at 6; Wright, supra at
435-37.
281 The following types of information are deemed prejudicial by the authorities indicated. (1) Confessions: State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 380, 204 A.2d 841, 852
(1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987 (1965); Jaffee, The Press and the Oppressed-PartI,
56 J. Cwhi. L., C. & P.S. 1, 5 (1965); Jaffee, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 504,
524 (1965); Will, supra note 179, at 215; Comment, 51 CORNE.L L.Q. 306, 323 (1966);
Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 217, 252 (1962). (2) Prior criminal activities: State v. Van
Duyne, supra at 389, 204 A.2d at 852; Jaffee, The Press and the Oppressed-PartI,
56 J. Cram. L., C. & P.. 1, 6 (1965); Jaffee, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 504,
524 (1965); Will, supra note 179, at 215; Comment, 51 ComR.L L.Q. 806, 323 (1966);
Note, 54 Ky. L.J. 141, 152 (1965); Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 217, 252 (1962). (3)
Illegally seized incriminating evidence: Jaffee, The Press and the Oppressed-Part I,
56 J. Qm. L., C. & P.S. 1, 6-7 (1965); Will, supra note 179, at 215; Note, 54 Ky. L.J.
141, 152 (1965); Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 217, 252 (1962). (4) Statements of persons who may not actually testify: Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 833, 361 (1966);
Jaffee, The Press and the Oppressed-PartI, 56 J. Cam. L., C. & P.S. 1, 6 (1965); Note,
54 KY. L.J. 141, 152 (1965); Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 217, 252 (1962). (5) Reports
of proceedings from which the jury has been excluded: Jaffee, The Press and the
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restrictions.'8 3

mentation of the
Each of these factors will be considered with reference to the treatment given them by the Standards
and by the relevant case law and commentary.
Subject Matter
The Standards list six categories of restricted material, the dissemination of which would be controlled, including information
that relates to the prior criminal record or character of the defendant;
the existence or contents of any confession given by the defendant;
the performance of any tests or the refusal of the defendant to submit thereto; the identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective
witnesses; the possibility of a plea of guilty; and the defendant's
84
guilt or innocence.
Oppressed-Part1,56 J. CRiM. L., C. & P.S. 1, 7 (1965); Note, 54 Ky. L.J. 141, 152
(1965); Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. Rv. 217, 252 (1962). (6) Refusal to submit to lie detector test: Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra at 361; Will, supra note 179, at 215. (7) Information bearing on guilt or innocence: Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra at 361; Jaffee,
Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv 504, 524 (1965); Comment, 51 CoRN LL L.Q. 806,
323 (1966). (8) Statements concerning the merits of the case: Sheppard v. Maxwell,
supra at 361; State v. Van Duyne, supra at 389, 204 A.2d at 852.
182See notes 217-19 infra and accompanying text.
'sCompare Will, supra note 179, at 211-14 with Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. Rav. 217,
251-54 (1962).
"8,
STANDARDS § 1.1 recommends that the Canons of Professional Ethics be revised to
prohibit disclosures by lawyers concerning the accused's prior criminal record, performance of or refusal to submit to any tests or examinations, identity or testimony
of prospective witnesses, possibility of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense, and statements
concerning the merits of the case.
STANDARDS § 2.1 recommends that law enforcement officers subject to the jurisdiction of the court not make any extrajudicial statements relating to the same six areas
enumerated in § 1.1.
STANDARDS § 2.3 would prohibit "any judicial employee from disclosing, to any unauthorized person, information relating to a pending criminal case that is not part
of the public records of the court and that may tend to interfere with the right of
the people or of the defendant to a fair trial."
STANDARDS § 3.5 (c) provides that "whenever appropriate in light of the issues in the
case or the notoriety of the case, the court shall instruct parties and witnesses not to
make extrajudicial statements, relating to the case or the issues in the case, for dissemination by any means of public communication during the course of the trial."
STANDARDS § 3.5 (d) states that "if the jury is not sequestered, the defendant shall be
permitted to move that the public be excluded from any portion of the trial that takes
place outside the presence of the jury on the ground that dissemination of evidence or
argument adduced at the hearing is likely to interfere with the defendant's right to a
fair trial by an impartial jury."
STANDARDS § 4.1 relates to the general public; it prohibits certain disclosures and
provides sanctions "against a person who, knowing that a criminal trial by jury is in
progress or that a jury is being selected for such a trial: (i) disseminates by any
means of public communication or extrajudicial statement relating to the defendant
or to the issues in the case that goes beyond the public record of the court in the
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Because of the state of the law concerning extrajudicial confessions, it is never certain that the defendant's incriminating disclosures will be admissible until his statement is received in court.8 5
Moreover, nothing is so damning as an admission from the accused's
own lips, even if it is later deemed incompetent 8 6 The Standards
would preclude out-of-court dissemination of material concerning
87
any confession, admission, or statement made by the defendant.
To curb the manifest potential for prejudice arising from the disclosure of a possible negotiated plea of guilty, the Standards would
prohibit dissemination of material relating to the entry of a guilty
plea to the offense charged or to a lesser offense. 88
In view of the evidentiary limitations imposed upon the introduction of the defendant's prior criminal record or evidence of his
bad character, 8 9 the Standards' position with regard to this type of
information is eminently sound. 190 In striking contrast are the
case, if the statement is reasonably calculated to affect the outcome of the trial and
seriously threatens to have such an effect; or (ii) makes such a statement with the
expectation that it will be so disseminated."
"'See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
18
See letter from New York County District Attorney Hogan, 131 N.Y.L.J., April 22,
1954, p. 4, cols. 3-4, in which he defends his policy of declining to disclose the contents
of statements made by prospective criminal defendants, or to label such statements as
confessions: "It seems undeniable that widely disseminated information that a defendant
has 'confessed' has the effect of convincing the general public that he is unquestionably
guilty and that any trial will be a mere formality. To obtain an impartial jury under
such circumstances, therefore, may be a most difficult task. In its practical effect,
such publication tends to destroy the presumption that an accused is innocent until
he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.
"The vice inherent in the situation stands out in bolder relief where the statement
is never even received in evidence. Such a statement sometimes is excluded as not
being a confession at all by a court ruling that duress preceded or accompanied it;
or that it was given under some inducement of promise of benefit; or that it resulted
from some unfair psychological pressure; or that the person was in such an unstable
mental condition at the time as to preclude credence of any statement made by him.
For these or similar reasons indeed, the prosecutor himself may decide not to offer the
statement in evidence at the trial."
187 STANDARMS § 1.1 (2), See Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 51 (1951) (Jackson,
J., concurring), where a confession was published but never admitted into evidence.
In People v. Brommel, 56 Cal. 2d 629, 636, 15 Cal. Rptr. 909, 913, 364 P.2d 845, 849
(1961), the prosecutor released the accused's confession to the press; it was admitted
into evidence but the admission was held to have been erroneous.
183 STANDA~
I
§ 1.1 (5) (disclosure by lawyers); § 2.1 (5) (disclosure by law enforcement officers). Possibly § 4.1 (a) (i) (note 184 supra) might include guilty pleas with
the result that the news media would be liable for contempt. See Griffin v. United
States, 295 Fed. 437 (3d Cir. 1924).
188See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
190 STANDARDS § 1.1 (1) (disclosure by lawyers); § 2.1 (1) (disclosure by law enforcement officers). Possibly § 4.1 (a) (i) (note 184 supra) might include the accused's prior
record with the result that the news media would be liable for contempt.
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Attorney General's Rules, which authorize the release of federal
convictions upon request.' 91 The justification advanced for this
practice is the public need to know about the success of the federal
penal system, its courts, prisons, parole boards, and about the extent
of recidivism.192 Similar reasons are advanced by critics of a prohibition on the dissemination of prior criminal records, 9 3 although
they fail to state why such information must be made available
before trial, rather than contemporaneously with its introduction
into evidence or after conclusion of the trial.
Another category of restricted material includes tests, their results,
or the accused's refusal to submit to them. 9 4 It has been suggested
that such information may have greater impact through pre-trial
disclosure than if it were brought out at trial where efforts could
be made to discredit its reliability or explain the accused's position
in not taking the test. 95 A similar justification exists for prohibiting
the dissemination of witnesses' statements. 9 6 In the Supreme Court's
Sheppard opinion there are references to "bombshell" witnesses
never produced' 97 and testimony never adduced at trial. 98 There
have been examples of witnesses so influenced by pre-trial exposure
that their testimony was later shown to have been the result of
suggestion and completely untrue' 9 While it may be argued that
disclosure will expose a changed story or fraud, 20 0 it likewise may
discourage an alteration of position based on recognition of an
earlier mistake.
291 See Dep't of Justice Release Relating to Criminal Proceedings, 28 C.F.R.

§ 50.2
192 (b) (4) (1965).

Ibid.
See, e.g., Daniel, Fair Trial and Freedom of the Press, Case & Com., Sept.-Oct.
1966, p. 3; Wiggins, The Press and Conflicts of Interest, 24 FED. B.J. 358, 360 (1964);
Wright, Fair Trial-FreePress, 38 F.R.D. 435 (1965).
t ' STANDARDS §§ 1.1 (3), 2.1 (3).
295 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 & n.15 (1966); United States ex rel.
Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364, 372-73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963);
Will, supra note 179, at 215; Comment, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 672, 676-83 (1965).
19 STANDARDS § 1.1 (4) (disclosure by lawyers); § 2.1 (4) (disclosure by law enforcement officers). Possibly § 4.1 (a) (i) (note 184 supra) might include witnesses' statements
with the result that the news media could be cited for contempt.
119Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 348 (1966).
1 3
' Id. at 360-61.
299 In one famous case the victim of a crime read a report that the fingerprints of
the accused were those of the culprit and she then identified the accused. He was
convicted on the basis of this identification even though no fingerprint evidence was
ever introduced in evidence. Fortunately, the defendant was later exonerated.
BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 194-200 (1932).
200 See Wiggins, The Public's Right to Public Trial, 19 F.R.D. 25, 27-28 (1955).
193
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A most serious aspect of pre-trial disclosure, often described as

"trial by newspaper" but not limited to that particular medium, 20 1

is the pre-trial verdict or expression of guilt. Some commentators
have stated that such statements by police and prosecutors are discounted by the public,

20 2

but others suggest that the amount of

credence derives from the official nature of the source.2 0 3 Under this
latter view, opinions of the judiciary are the most harmful,

lowed by those of government officials such as

legislators, 20 5

20 4

fol-

prosecu-

20 7
tors,20 6 and police.

The Standardsalso list material which is excepted from the class
of restricted information. 20 8 Circumstances of arrest, including time,
place, resistance, pursuit, and the use of weapons, and descriptions
of the investigation and the evidence seized may be released for
dissemination 2 0 9 However, these may in fact be unwarranted and
undesirable exceptions. There does not appear to be a sound distinction between the public's need to know about prior crimes and
its need for information concerning resistance at arrest; both disclosures tend to show the general bad character of the accused.
Moreover, as is the case with a prior criminal record, evidence of
flight to avoid capture may be admissible, but only under limiting
instructions. 210 In addition, the possibility for prejudice arising
from the disclosure of seized evidence may be as great as that arising
201 "We use the term 'trial by newspaper' as a shorthand for the variety of means
whereby all sorts of information germane to a criminal case is published prior to or
pending the trial." Jaffee, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 504 (1965).

202 See id. at 519; Wright, supra note 193, at 436-37.

200 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966); State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J.
369, 389, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987 (1965).
201 See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 468-72 (1933); Burroughs v. United
States, 365 F.2d 431, 433-34 (10th Cir. 1966); Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636, 639
(6th Cir. 1955); Henry v. United States, 204 F.2d 817, 821 (6th Cir. 1953); United
States v. Powell, 171 F. Supp. 202, 205 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
.0i See Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 114-15 (1st Cir. 1952); United States
v. Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (motion for change of venue granted
where much of adverse publicity appearing in the press had its origin in the investigation of the New York State Crime Commission).

2001
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 197-98 (1952); United States v. Milanovich,
303 F.2d 626, 629-30 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 876 (1962); Fouquette v. Bernard,
198 F.2d 96, 98-100 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 912 (1953).
207 Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 51 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring), where it was
published that the defendants had confessed and the statement was attributed to the
sheriff. No confession was ever introduced at the trial.
208 STANDARDS

§§ 1.1 (6), 2.1 (6).

20DIbid.

210 See Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431, 432-33 (10th Cir. 1966).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1967: 593

from the disclosure of extrajudicial confessions, for the ultimate
211
admissibility of such evidence is equally uncertain.
An additional category of material exempted from restriction
by the Standardsconsists of information needed to aid in the capture
of a suspect and to warn the public of his dangerous traits. 212 Although this exception is apparently based on greater public necessity
than those dealing with circumstances of arrest, even in this context
restraint may be in order so that the emphasis is placed on informa21 3
tion rather than sensationalism.
Under the Standards' recommendations the only matter publishable during the trial would be the public record of the proceedings,
devoid of comment. On motion by or with the consent of the
accused, the public might be excluded from hearings out of the
jury's presence when the argument or evidence is such that its dissemination might prejudice the accused. A complete record of such
a hearing would be kept and made available to the public after
trial. In addition, the judge would have the power to control the
dissemination of matter by those permitted to remain when the
jury is absent.21 4 Post-verdict statements would be proscribed to the
extent that they might influence any further proceedings.2 15
Timing
The effectiveness of any limitations on disclosure will depend
largely upon when they become controlling. The Standardssuggest
Neither the federal government nor the states may convict a defendant by means
of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal
search and seizure. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643 (1961). Obviously, if publicity
makes the jury aware that inadmissible evidence implicating the defendant has been
obtained, his constitutional right not to be convicted on the basis of illegally seized
evidence is irreparably damaged. For example, in United States v. Kum Seng Seo, 300
F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962), the defendant was indicted for receiving and concealing heroin.
The defense constructed its case on the theory that the heroin belonged to the defendant's daughter. During the course of the trial a newspaper article appeared, which the
jurors read, stating that the heroin had been found in defendant's room. The story
was completely untrue. The case was reversed under Marshall, but it is mentioned
here as an illustration of the problem.
Most proposals recognize the possibility for prejudice arising from the disclosure
of information relating to illegally seized evidence. See, e.g., Note, 54 Ky. L.J. 141, 152
211

(1965); Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. Riv. 217, 252 (1962).
222 STANDARDS § 2.2 (a).

213 See Juelich v. United States, 214 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1954).

21 STANDARDS § 3.5 (d).
15
2 Id. § 1.1 (statements by lawyers). It is significant to note that the restriction on

post-verdict pronouncements is not applied to law enforcement officials by the STANDARDS. Id. § 2.1.
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strong enforcement provisions from the time of formal arrest, indictment, or information.2 10 In addition, law enforcement agencies are
urged to limit their own releases through departmental regulations.
Such regulations would conform to the spirit of the Standards'
restrictions in precluding anything unnecessarily prejudicial to the
accused and by taking effect as soon as the commission of a crime is
suspected.217 On the other hand, antidissemination remedies which
have been proposed by courts and commentators take effect later in
time, either at indictment2 18 or at the initiation of voir dire examination. 219 These proposals seem to assume the effectiveness of voir
dire or the inability to enforce restrictions on disclosure before a
court assumes jurisdiction of the case. 220 Restrictions on dissemination during the trial have been imposed where pre-trial publicity had
been highly inflammatory, 221 but such restrictions have also been
successfully challenged as unconstitutional abridgments of first
amendment freedoms. 222 The Standards' antidissemination provisions would be effective until the potentially prejudicial material
had become part of the public record or could no longer influence
a jury.2 23 Sequestration of the jury or waiver of jury trial would
obviate the necessity of these provisions.
Beginning the restrictions on disclosure at the time of arrest,
rather than at some later time, would seem preferable in terms of
prevention of prejudice to the accused, although more stringent
enforcement procedures might be desirable to limit pre-arrest disclosure by police. The Standards would subject the press to sanctions for dissemination only when a jury trial is in progress or during
220Id. § 1.1 (statements by lawyers); id. § 2.1 (statements by law enforcement
officials). The press, however, is liable to a contempt citation only when a "criminal
trial by jury is in progress . . . or [when] . . . a jury is being selected for such a
trial .... " Id. § 4.1 (a).
217 See id. § 2.2. Other recent proposals have advocated that no dissemination of
information should be permitted by any person after the commission of the alleged
crime. See Jaffee, The Press and the Oppressed-Part.11, 56 J. Cane. L., C. & P.S. 158,
167 (1965); Note, 54 Ky. L.J. 141, 151 (1965); Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 217, 251
(1962).

218 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966).
210

Jaffee, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. R.v. 504, 524 (1965).
See id. at 521-22; Special Comm. on Radio, Television and the Administration
of Justice of the N.Y.C.B.A., Report. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1967, p. 18, cols. 1-5
(city ed.).
221 McDonald v. United States, 282 F.2d 737, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1960).
2.2 See Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594
(1966);
Wall Street Journal, March 7, 1967, p. 18, col. 3.
22
3 See STANDARDS §§ 1.1, 2.1.
220
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the process of jury selection. 224 This approach would leave immune
the type of pre-trial editorial attacks on police which occurred in the
Sheppard case.225 Furthermore, the provision for removing restrictions when material becomes a matter of public record at the trial 220

would allow for accurate and timely coverage of trials in progress,
negating the suggestion 22 7 that these restrictions would produce a
return to Star Chamber procedures.

Implementation
The truly controversial proposals of the Standards are those
dealing with the designation of those upon whom disclosure restrictions should be placed and with the suggestion of methods to produce
compliance or sanction noncompliance. 22 Here are raised the
familiar cries of censorship, press muzzling, and police state tactics.229
While certain of the restrictions meet general approval, 230 the concept
of enforced nondisclosure on a wide scale foments heated discussion.' 1
Little controversy arises from the proposals which would restrict
"'Id. §4.1 (a).
"2 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37, 44-60 (S.D. Ohio 1964), rev'd, 546
F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966). Restrictions upon dissemination by the press only when a trial is in progress would also permit pretrial editorial
attacks on the accused.
220 STANDARDS § 1.1 (statements by lawyers); id. § 2.3 (statements by judicial employees); id. § 4.1 (a) (i) (statements by any person).
227 See Daniel, supra note 193, at 6; Wiggins, The Public's Right to Public Trial,
19 F.R.D. 25, 26 (1955); Wright, supra note 193, at 435-36.
228 STANDARDS § 4.1 (a) recommends limited use of the contempt power against any
person who "disseminates by any means of public communication an extrajudicial
statement relating to the defendant or to the issues in the case that goes beyond the
public record of the court in the case, if the statement is reasonably calculated to
affect the outcome of the trial and seriously threatens to have such an effect ...."
In addition to encountering opposition from the news media, this suggestion has been
criticized by the individual-oriented American Civil Liberties Union. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 8, 1966, p. 54, col. 4 (city ed.).
229 Daniel, supra note 193, at 6.
230 The American Civil Liberties Union did not object to restrictions upon attorneys
and law enforcement officials. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1966, p. 54, col. 4 (city ed.). In addition, many advocates of the news media position have maintained that enforcement of
Canon 20 (see note 232 infra) and the silencing of the police are desirable. "What
matters most is not what newspapers say but what lawyers and judges do. The press,
for the most part, merely holds up a mirror to these actions." Daniel, supra note 193,
at 4. See Wiggins, The Press and Conflicts of Interest, 24 FED. B.J. 358, 361 (1964);
Wright, supra note 193, at 438.
281 See SPECIAL CONV. ON FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL OF THE AMERICAN NEWsPAPER
PUBLISHERS Ass'N, REPORT: FRE. PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL 1-10 (1967); Daniel, supra note
193, at 6.
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statements by attorneys for both prosecution and defense. Such a
restriction is not markedly different from canon 20,232 which now
supposedly governs the actions of attorneys. Many critics of broad
compulsory restrictions point with scorn to the ineffectiveness of
canon 20,233 while members of the legal profession attribute the

impotence of canon 20 to a lack of effective enforcement. 234 The
Standards suggest that restrictive measures be enforced by both bar
associations and the bench, with the contempt power ultimately
available. 23 5 In the latter connection, it has been suggested that
the status of attorneys as officers of the court will allow punishment
by contempt proceedings. 236 However, the Supreme Court opinion
in In re Sawyer237 may cast doubt upon this assumption.

In that

case the suspension from practice of an attorney for constructive
contempt was vacated.2 38 The decision ostensibly turned on a
question of proof,239 but there are intimations in the opinion that

the strict "clear and present danger" approach used in the more
recent contempt by publication cases 240 will be applied. 241

If so

strict a standard were imposed, the effectiveness of contempt as a
242
sanction for wrongful disclosure would be severely limited.
232 A.B.A. CANON OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 20: "Newspaper publications by a lawyer

as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and
otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to the
public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts
should not go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in the Court; but
even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex parte statement."
A strengthened canon of legal ethics, coupled with voluntary nondisclosure by law
enforcement officials, comprise the solution to prejudicial publicity presented by the
Special Committee on Radio, Television and the Administration of Justice of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1967, p. 18,
cols. 1-5 (city ed.).
233 See, e.g., Stanton, Free Press. v. Fair Trial: The Broadcaster's View, 41 N.D.L.
REv. 7, 10 (1964); Wiggins, The Press and Conflicts of Interest, 24 F.D. B.J. 358, 361-62
(1964).
23, See Wright, supra note 193, at 438.
23 STANDARDS § 1.3. But cf. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
211See Shepard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966); State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369,
389, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987 (1965); Jaffee, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 504, 520-21 (1965); cf. Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 994 (1966). But cf. Spevack v. Klein, supra note 235.
" 360 U.S. 622 (1959) (5-4 decision).
2
1 Id. at 626-27.
2' See Jaffee, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 504, 520 (1965).
241 See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
"' See Jaffee, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 504, 520 (1965).
'2" The past history of constructive criminal contempt in the United States illustrates
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There is greater controversy concerning the restriction of the
second class of persons designated by the Standards, namely, law
enforcement officers. 243 Many have been quick to challenge not
only the wisdom but the legality of such restrictions, citing both the
public's need to know that the police are functioning efficiently and
the need for public scrutiny of police methods.244 It should be noted
that under the Standards' proposal there would not be total suppression of police releases, but merely a delay until they could not
influence the trial of the arrested person. 245 Public pressure might
not be able to immediately correct abuses if a delay were required,
nor could there be instant announcement of the efficiency of law
enforcement; however, the same overall results might still be
achieved after the danger to an individual accused had passed.
Much of the restricted material would be of public record, such
how the effectiveness of the contempt power can be expanded or circumscribed by
judicial interpretation. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83, empowered

the courts of the United States to "punish by fine or imprisonment, at [their] ... discretion ... all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before [them] ... ." In
1831, after several abuses of this unlimited power resulting in the proceedings of impeachment against Federal District Judge James H. Peck, [see STANDSBURY, REPORT OF
THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK (1833)], Congress passed the Act of March 2, 1831, 4 Stat.
487 [substantially embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1) (1964)], which limited the power
of summary punishment to "misbehavior" in the "presence of" the court, or "so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice." The Court sustained the act in
Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1873). With the passage of time the historical antecedent of this act became obscured and in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United
States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918), over dissents by Justices Brandeis and Holmes, the Court
construed the "so near thereto" provision in causal rather than a geographical sense
and sustained the use of constructive criminal contempt, thus reducing the act to its
pre-1831 form. In Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941), the Court overruled Toledo
and construed the words "so near thereto" in a geographical sense. See generally
United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 864 (D. Md. 1961).
213 STANDARDS § 2.1.
See also id. § 2.3 (prohibiting disclosures by judicial employees).
The STANDARDS do not, however, confront the problem of disclosure by government
officials, which can be as pernicious as the actions which the STANDARDS do restrict. See
Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952) (congressional subcommittee investigation); United States v. Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (state crime commission investigation).
214See Daniel, Fair Trial and Freedom of the Press, Case & Com., Sept.-Oct. 1966,
p. 3, at 4, 6; Wiggins, The Press and Conflicts of Interest, 24 FED. B.J. 358, 360-61
(1964); Wright, Fair Trial-FreePress, 38 F.R.D. 435-36 (1965).
Critics of restrictions on disclosure by police state that freedom of the press must
of necessity include .the right to gather, to print, and to circulate information and that
any restrictions upon the sources of information are an indirect attempt to unconstitutionally abridge the freedom of the press. See SPECIAL COMM. ON FREE PRESS AND
FAIR TRIAL OF THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASS'N, REPORT: FREE PRESS AND FAIR

TRIAL 1-6 (1967).
245 STANDARDS 77-79.
See Sigourney, Fair Trial and Free Press-A Proposed Solution,
51 MASS. L.Q. 117, 120 (1966).
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as a prior criminal record, but the results of restrictions on police
disclosure in test cities246 and the reasoning in many judicial

opinions and scholarly writings2 4 7 suggest that these restrictions
alone would do much to correct current abuses. The Standards
would authorize use of the contempt power when there had been
police disclosure after arrest or formal initiation of criminal pro-

ceedings, but would leave to departmental regulation and control
restrictions during earlier periods.248 It may be that internal control would provide sufficient flexibility to allow some disclosure in

a particularly heinous crime to prevent public panic and that the
trial level and appellate remedies could then be invoked to ensure

fairness to the accused.
The controversy attains climactic proportions with regard to the
Standards' proposals recommending use of the contempt power
against "persons who disseminate information by means of public
communication.

249

The preface to the contempt proposals is a

weak disclaimer of the powers advocated therein.250 The contempt
power would be used against anyone who, knowing that a jury trial
was in progress or that jury selection had begun, disseminated matter
from a closed hearing contrary to judicial order or disseminated an
extrajudicial statement relating to the defendant or to the issues in
the case which went beyond the public trial record, if the statement
was reasonably calculated to affect the outcome of the trial and
seriously threatened to have that effect. 25' The wisdom of restrictions
of the news media has been widely debated, 252 and the constitu210See STANDARDS 25-47; id. app. A 163-64 (comparison of Newark papers revealed
over ninety per cent drop in the reporting of prejudicial matter following the decision
in State v. Van Duyne, 41 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987
(1965)).
247See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 359, 361 (1966); State v. Van Duyne,
supra note 246, at 389, 204 A.2d at 852; Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trials
and the Cause Celebre, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 810, 833-34 (1961); Note, 54 Ky.L.J. 141, 151
(1965).
248 STANNDARs §§ 2.1, .2. However, several authorities have contended that pressure
exerted upon the police by the press accounts in part for the prejudicial disclosures
made by law enforcement officials. See BARNES & TEaxms, NEW HORIZONS IN CIaMINOLOGY 192-98 (2d ed. 1951); PutrrrouEaR, ADMINISTRATION OF CRImANAL Lw 55
(1953); TAr, dRIMINOLOGY 210 n.47 (rev. ed. 1950). Whether the law enforcement
officials will be able to resist the pressure to "cooperate" with the press and to enforce
sufficient restrictions is an open question.
219STANDARDS § 4.1.

"o Ibid.

2'IId. §§4.1 (a)- (b).

22 See INBAU 8- SOWLE, CASES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE

1094-96 (1964); Goldfarb, supra
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tionality of such controls has endured extensive discussion with a
similar lack of resolution. 25 3 The Supreme Court cases severely limiting the power to punish contempt by publication 25 4 are explained
away in the Standardsand by some commentators as arising without
statutory authority and in nonjury proceedings, 2 5 but their general
tenor cannot be ignored. 256 The contempt proposals of the Standards
seem to be based on the premise that a sufficiently clear standard
will survive review, the foundation on which several statutory
remedies proposed by commentators also rest.257 However, by imposing restrictions on the press only during trial, the Standards must
either assume the adequacy of enforced nondisclosure on other
sources to limit or eliminate press dissemination prior to trial, or
strike the balance between fairness and dissemination so as to
avoid the problem. The difficulties of impaneling an impartial
jury must necessarily persist even under the Standards if the press
is able to print prior to trial inflammatory matter obtained from
nonprohibited sources, such as the victim or witnesses.
CONCLUSION

In order to secure a "fair trial" the Standards place the major
burden of nondisclosure on the legal profession and law enforcement
officials. 258 Some members of the press feel that the burden should
Jaffee, The Press and the Oppressed-Parti, 56 J. CRIM. L., C. &
P.S. 1, 8-11 (1965); Jaffee, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 504, 517-24 (1965);
Stanton, Fair Press v. Fair Trial: The Broadcaster's View, 41 N.D.L. REV. 7, 9-10
(1964); Wiggins, The Press and Conflicts of Interest, 24 FED. B.J. 358, 360-62 (1964);
Wright, supra note 244, at 439; Comment, 51 Com=NEL L.Q. 306, 318-22 (1966); Note,
60 COLUM. L. Rav. 349, 372-75 (1960); Note, 54 Ky. L.J. 141, 143-50 (1965); Comment,
57 Nw. U.L. Rv. 217, 226-33 (1962).
3
21 See Comment, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 306, 321-22 (1966).
211 See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 US. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
2
55 See STANDARDS 153-55; e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 247, at 831; Wright, supra note
244, at 439.
256 See Jaffee, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 504, 523 (1965); Will, Free
Press vs. Fair Trial, 12 DEPAUL L. REV. 197, 211 (1963).
251 See Jaffee, The Press and the Oppressed-Part11, 56 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 158,
165-66 (1965); Jaffee, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 504, 523 (1965); Note,
54 KY. L.J. 141, 151-53 (1965); Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 217, 250 (1962).
28 STANDARDS § 1.1 (statements by lawyers); id. § 2.1 (statements by law enforcement
officials). This approach is to be contrasted with the English system where the major
burden of nondisclosure is placed upon the press. See generally Fox, THE HisTORY OF
CONTEMPT OF Coutr 5-43, 202-26 (1927); Gillmor, Free Press and Fair Trial in English Law, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 17 (1965); Goldfarb, supra note 247, at 824-28;
Note, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 1278, 1280-82 (1959); Note, 34 U. CiNc. L. REv. 503, 518-22
(1965).
note 247, at 824-31;
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be entirely on the press voluntarily to suppress inflammatory material,259 and they refuse to accept the notion of externally imposed
restraints. 260 Whatever the desirability of any particular remedy
may be, it would seem that the tide is turning toward compulsory
nondisclosure in some form.261 Should this result without a prior
exhaustion of the possibilities of liberalized trial and appellate
remedies and self-restraint by both press and bar, a great disservice
will have been done to society. The main fault must then be with
the bar for failing to enforce its own canon and for violating its
trusteeship over the legal system. While the threat of contempt
action may stimulate press reform, 6 2 it is suggested that trial, appellate, and professional ethical standards first be thoroughly tested
before resorting to the use of contempt. By such a procedure the bar
would be upholding its trust and would strengthen public confidence
in the profession. Only if such a concerted effort fails should
the bar unite in favor of compulsory restrictions on the press, for
only then can the need for them be adequately ascertained.
R.J.M.
S.P.P.
25

20

See Daniel, supra note 244, at 6-9.
Id. at 6.

21"M~e must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those
remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 33, 363 (1966). See Wright, supra note 244, at 439.
212 See ibid.

